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FAITH (HEALING), HOPE AND CHARITY AT THE FDA:
THE POLITICS OF AIDS DRUG TRIALS
GEORGE J. ANNAS*
I. INTRODUCTION
AIDS forces us to confront our mortality, the limits of modern
medicine and the contours of our compassion. How we re-
spond is a measure of our society and a reflection of our values
and priorities. As a fundamentally death-denying society, our re-
sponse has been hampered by denial and shaped by faith that a
technological fix will make the AIDS epidemic go away. Technol-
ogy is our new religion, our "modern" way to deal with death. As
novelist Don DeLillo has one of his characters put it to another
who is worried about death: you can deny it, you can put your
faith in religion or
[y]ou [can] put your faith in technology. It got you here,
it can get you out. This is the whole point of technology.
It creates an appetite for immortality on the one hand. It
threatens universal extinction on the other....
It's what we invented to conceal the terrible secret
of our decaying bodies. But it's also life, isn't it? It pro-
longs life, it provides new organs for those that wear out.
New devices, new techniques every day. Lasers, masers,
ultrasound. Give yourself up to it.... They'll insert you
in a gleaming tube, irradiate your body with the basic
stuff of the universe. Light, energy, dreams. God's own
goodness. I
The less we understand about medical technology, the more
we see it as magic. Nor are physicians immune from magical
thinking. As psychiatrist Jay Katz has noted, when medical sci-
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ence seems impotent to fight the claims of nature, "all kinds of
senseless interventions are tried in an unconscious effort to cure
the incurable magically through a 'wonder drug,' a novel surgical
procedure, or a penetrating psychological interpretation." 2 Katz
noted further that although physicians often justify such interven-
tions as simply being responsive to patient needs, "[they] may
turn out to be a projection of their own needs onto patients." 3 In
a parallel fashion, we speak of medical "miracles" in recounting
techniques we cannot understand, but nonetheless in which we
want to believe. We have become modern believers in faith heal-
ing, faith based not in a Supreme Being, but in Supreme Science.
The AIDS epidemic has frightened us into believing that
medicine will find a cure soon, and this misplaced faith in science
has helped erode the distinction between experimentation and
therapy; has threatened to transform the United States Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) from a consumer protection agency
into a medical technology promotion agency; and has put AIDS
patients, already suffering from an incurable disease, at further
risk of psychological, physical and financial exploitation by those
who would sell them useless drugs. The not-too-subtle metamor-
phosis of the FDA has been abetted by an unusual political
alliance between the anti-regulation Reagan and Bush administra-
tions and gay rights activists.
This article argues that the distinction between experimental
and therapeutic interventions is crucial to both science and indi-
vidual rights, and that the FDA should continue to responsibly
regulate experimental drugs and maintain its identity as a premier
consumer protection agency. We should not permit the AIDS ep-
idemic to be used as an excuse to dismantle the FDA or to put the
integrity of our drugs and medical devices at risk. True compas-
sion for AIDS patients does not involve dispensing false hope or
unreasonable hype. It requires adequate funding and staffing of
the National Institutes of Health's (NIH) AIDS drug and vaccine
research and testing programs, and maintaining scientifically
sound testing methodologies that can provide reasonable assur-
ance that the drugs that are sold as therapies are safe and effec-
tive. To examine the politics of AIDS drug development, it is first
necessary to understand the purposes for the experimentation-
therapy distinction in medicine and the values that this distinction
promotes and protects.
2. J. KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DocTOR AND PATIENT 151 (1984).
3. Id.
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II. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN EXPERIMENTATION AND THERAPY
Perhaps the major source of controversy surrounding drug
trials for experimental AIDS drugs is that the investigators see
these trials as research designed to provide generalizable knowl-
edge that may help others, 4 while most individuals suffering with
AIDS see these trials as therapy designed to benefit them.5 This
misconception is not new, 6 and a glance at the history of human
experimentation shows why this difference in perspectives is so
important.
A reasonable summary of many of the major issues in human
experimentation appears in Gustave Flaubert's realistic novel
Madame Bovary. 7 A character in this novel, Charles Bovary, de-
cided to try to make his name as a physician by curing the local
stableman's clubfoot with experimental surgery. The experiment
involved cutting the Achilles tendon and then screwing the foot
and leg into "a sort of box weighing about eight pounds-a com-
plicated mass of iron, wood, tin, leather, screws and nuts," 8 which
4. Some commentators object to the research-practice dichotomy, arguing
that all therapy has elements of research in it, and much of medical practice
involves the use of "nonvalidated practices" or "investigational" procedures
that have not been subjected to rigorous research methods. Professor RobertJ.
Levine probably makes the argument as well as anyone in his standard reference
on research with human subjects. See R. LEVINE, ETHICS AND REGULATION OF
CLINICAL RESEARCH 3-10 (2d ed. 1986). Nonetheless, no matter what terms are
employed, the fundamental question remains: when is it reasonable and appro-
priate to use standard rules regarding research on human beings to protect their
interests, and when can these rules be ignored or abandoned altogether? This,
of course, is the central question in using "new," "investigational" and
"nonvalidated" drugs and treatments on AIDS patients. In this regard, chang-
ing the terminology does not help either patients or their providers to deter-
mine any better than the research-practice dichotomy does whether special
protections are required.
5. Levine, Has AIDS Changed the Ethics of Human Subjects Research?, 16 LAW
MED. & HEALTH CARE 167, 171 (1988). Levine answers the question posed in
the title of her article by pointing out the changes AIDS research has made in
research ethics. First, the consent of the subject to use certain specimens in
research is not always required. Id. at 169. Second, subjects are not necessarily
informed of their test results. Id. at 170. Third, the confidentiality of subjects'
identity is often compromised when balanced against "third parties who may be
placed at risk by their subjects' behavior." Id.
6. Id. at 171-72 (quoting Appelbaum, Roth, Lidz et al., False Hopes and Best
Data.- Consent to Research and the Therapeutic Misconception, HASTINGS CENTER REP.,
Apr. 1987, at 20) (therapeutic misconception is when patient who is also subject
feels "that every aspect of the research project to which he had consented was
designed to benefit him directly"). Rather than characterize any particular drug
as a "research drug" versus a "therapy drug," it is probably more accurate to
think of a drug as falling on a continuum from "experimental" to "investiga-
tional" to '!suspected effective" to "nonvalidated" to "proven effective."
7. G. FLAUBERT, MADAME BOVARY (F. Steegmuller trans. 1957).
8. Id. at 198.
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was constructed by the cabinetmaker and the locksmith. The
apothecary, who was an avid promoter of the operation, tried to
convince Charles's wife, Emma, of the operation's merits by ask-
ing her:
"After all .... what's the risk? Look." And he enumer-
ated on his fingers the advantages that would accrue
from the attempt. "Almost sure success, relief and im-
proved appearance for the patient, and for the surgeon a
rapid rise to fame. Why shouldn't your husband fix up
poor Hippolyte?"''
The entire town urged the stableman to consent but "what
finally decided him was that it wouldn't cost him anything.""' The
experiment did not go as planned and another physician eventu-
ally was called to amputate the hideously painful and gangrenous
leg.'' Most experiments do not have such disastrous results for
patients; but many share similar dangers, as well as the same
motivations on the part of both physician and patient, the same
inability to separate hope from realistic appraisal of likely out-
comes and the same inability to distinguish voluntary consent
from coercion. To protect subjects, rules have been developed
regarding human experimentation.
The most comprehensive and authoritative legal statement
on human experimentation is embodied in the ten-point Nurem-
berg Code, articulated in a court opinion following the trial of
Nazi physicians for "war crimes and crimes against humanity"
committed during World War 11. 12 These crimes included human
experiments designed to determine which poisons killed the fast-
est, how long people could live when exposed to ice water and
when exposed to high altitudes, and whether surgically severed
limbs could be reattached.' The Nuremberg tribunal rejected
the defendants' contention that their experiments on both prison-
ers of war and civilians were consistent with the ethics of the med-
ical profession as evidenced by previously published American,
French and British experiments on venereal disease, plague, and
9. Id. at 196.
10. Id. at 198 (emphasis added).
11. Id. at 207.
12. 2 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBU-
NALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10 181-82 (1949) [hereinafter Nu-
ERNBERG TRIALS].
13. 1 NUERNBERG TRIALS, supra note 12, at 11-14.
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malaria, and by American prison experiments, among others.14
The tribunal concluded that only "certain types of medical exper-
iments on human beings, when kept within reasonably well-defined
bounds, conform to the ethics of the medical profession
generally." 15
These well-defined bounds are articulated in the ten princi-
ples which make up the Nuremberg Code. The basis of the Code
is a type of natural law reasoning. In the tribunal's words: "All
agree ... that certain basic principles must be observed in order
to satisfy moral, ethical and legal concepts."' 1 Principle 1 of the
Nuremberg Code requires that the consent of the experimental
subject have at least four characteristics: it must be competent,
voluntary, informed and comprehending. 17 This is to protect the
subject's rights.
The other nine principles have to do primarily with protect-
ing the subject's welfare: they prescribe actions that must be
taken prior to seeking subject enrollment in the experiment and
actions that must be taken to protect the subject during the ex-
periment. These include a determination that the experiment is
properly designed to yield fruitful results "unprocurable by other
methods"; that "anticipated results" will justify performance of
the experiment; that all "unnecessary physical and mental suffer-
ing and injury" is avoided; that there is no "a priori reason to be-
lieve that death or disabling injury will occur"; that the project
14. 2 NUERNBERG TRIALS, supra note 12, at 92-93.
15. Id. at 181 (emphasis added).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 181-82. The first basic principle laid down by the judges was:
The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential.
This means that the person involved should have legal capacity to
give consent; should be so situated as to be able to exerciseftee power of
choice, without the intervention of any element of force, fraud, deceit,
duress, over-reaching, or other ulterior form of constraint or coercion;
and should have sufficient knowledge and comprehension of the elements of
the subject matter involved as to enable him to make an understanding
and enlightened decision. This latter element requires that before the
acceptance of an affirmative decision by the experimental subject there
should be made known to him the nature, duration, and purpose of the
experiment; the method and means by which it is to be conducted; all
inconveniences and hazards reasonably to be expected; and the effects
upon his health or person which may possibly come from his participa-
tion in the experiment.
The duty and responsibility for ascertaining the quality of the con-
sent rests upon each individual who initiates, directs or engages in the
experiment. It is a personal duty and responsibility which may not be
delegated to another with impunity.
Id. (emphasis added).
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has "humanitarian importance" that outweighs the degree of risk;
that adequate preparation is taken to "protect the experimental
subject against even remote possibilities of injury, disability, or
death"; that only "scientifically qualified" persons conduct the ex-
periment; that the subject can terminate participation at any time;
and that the experimenter is prepared to terminate the experi-
ment if "continuation of the experiment is likely to result in in-
jury, disability, or death to the experimental subject."' 8 The
Code has been used as the basis for other international docu-
ments such as the Declaration of Helsinki. It is a part of interna-
tional common law, and I have previously argued that it can
properly be viewed as both a criminal and civil basis for liability in
the United States.!)
18. Id. at 182.
19. G. ANNAS, L. GLANTZ & B. KATZ, INFORMED CONSENT TO HUMAN EXPERI-
MENTATION: THE SUBJECT'S DILEMMA 21 (1977). Surprisingly, when the United
States Supreme Court had a chance to adopt and endorse the principles of the
Nuremberg Code in 1987, it failed to recognize the Code as binding upon the
United States military. United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669 (1987) (5-to-4
decision).
Stanley involved a lawsuit brought by an Army serviceman who, while in the
service, had been secretly given LSD in 1958 to determine its effects. The LSD
caused Stanley to suffer from hallucinations, periods of incoherence and mem-
ory loss and to awaken in the middle of the night and violently beat his wife and
children. He was discharged from the Army in 1969 and divorced shortly there-
after because of the LSD-induced personality changes. In 1975, the Army sent
him a letter asking him to cooperate in a follow-up study on the long-term ef-
fects of LSD on "volunteers who participated" in the 1958 tests. This was the
first he learned of the experiment. Id. at 672. When his suit reached the United
States Supreme Court, the majority of the Court concluded that involuntary par-
ticipation in human experimentation was no exception to the rule that a service-
man could not sue the federal government for injuries which "arise out of or are
in the course of activity incident to service." Id. at 684.
The four dissentingJustices based their disapproval of this conclusion pri-
marily on the principles enunciated in the Nuremberg Code. Justice William
Brennan, writing in dissent, pointed out that it was "[tihe United States military
[who] developed the Code, which applies to all citizens-soldiers as well as civil-
ians." Id. at 687 (Brennan,J., dissenting). Justice Brennan went on to note that
in addition to the thousands of soldiers and civilians who have been subjected to
secret LSD experiments by the government, an estimated 250,000 military per-
sonnel were exposed to large doses of radiation between 1945 and 1963 while
engaged in maneuvers designed to determine the effectiveness of combat troops
in nuclear battlefield conditions. Explaining why the Nuremberg Code and the
principle of voluntary consent for which it stands must apply to the military as
well as civilians, Justice Brennan stated that "It]he subject of experimentation
who has not volunteered is treated as an object, a sample .... Soldiers ought
not be asked to defend a Constitution indifferent to their essential human dig-
nity." Id. at 708 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
This decision is a disgrace. The Nuremberg Code should be seen as setting
a minimal legal standard for licit human experimentation, both in and out of the
military. See generally R. LIFTON, THE NAZI DOCTORS: MEDICAL KILLING AND TIE
PSYCHOLOGY OF GENOCIDE 503 (1986) (Nazi genocide began with doctors killing
776
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Today the most likely subject of medical experimentation is
not the prisoner or even the soldier, but the patient with a dis-
ease. As a leading medical commentator has stated:
Volunteers for experiments will usually be influenced by
hopes of obtaining better grades, earlier parole, more
substantial egos, or just mundane cash. These pres-
sures, however, are but fractional shadows of those en-
closing the patient-subject. Incapacitated and hospitalized
because of illness, frightened by strange and impersonal routines,
and fearful for his health and perhaps life, he is farfrom exercis-
ing a free power of choice when the person to whom he
anchors all his hopes asks, "Say, you wouldn't mind,
would you, if you joined some of the other patients on
this floor and helped us to carry out some very important
research we are doing?" When "informed consent" is
obtained, it is not the student, the destitute bum, or the
prisoner to whom, by virtue of his condition, the thumb
screws of coercion are most relentlessly applied; it is the
most used and useful of all experimental subjects, the patient with
disease.21
0
When the illness is fatal, pressures on both the physician-re-
searcher and patient are much more acute, and the rules regard-
ing research seem less relevant. Consent also seems a sham since
patients are desperate and demand to be research subjects thinking
that this is their best hope of getting treatment for their condi-
tion. The assertion is made that patients have "nothing to lose"
by engaging in all manner of experimentation and that patients
should have the "right" to be experimental subjects. 2' But it is
when such political claims are made in the face of a fatal disease
in name of healing); Bassiouni, Baffes & Evrard, An Appraisal of Human Expeiimen-
ration in International Law and Practice: The Need for International Regulation of Human
Experimentation, 72J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1957, 1642 (1981) (human experi-
mentation is necessary for development of modern medicine and science, but
there needs to be international code establishing clear definition of human ex-
perimentation and boundaries to its lawfulness and unlawfulness).
20. Ingelfinger, Informed (But Uneducated) Consent, 287 NEW ENG. J. MED.
465, 466 (1972) (emphasis added).
21. A French AIDS researcher experimenting with HPA-23 said of AIDS
patients in 1984: "What do these people have to lose?" R. SIILTs, AND THE
BAND PLAYED ON 496 (1987). Even their advocates echo this rhetoric. See, e.g.,
L. KRAMER, REPORTS FROM THE HOLOCAUST 142 (1989) ("AIDS sufferers, who
have nothing to lose, are more than willing to be guinea pigs."). Similar state-
ments were made by physicians using experimental artificial hearts at about the
same time. Annas, The Phoeniix Heart: ll'hat l'e Have to Lose, HASTINGS CENTER
REP.,June 1985, at 15.
1989] 777
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
that consumer protection agencies like the FDA must stand firm
and insist on the scientific validity of those experiments. This is
because, as important as informed consent is, the first and most
important question is whether the experiment should be done at
all.22 Only after this determination has been made, based on fac-
tors such as prior animal and laboratory research, study design,
risk/benefit analysis and a consideration of the alternatives, is it
even legitimate to ask the subject to participate. 23 Without such
prior determinations and the development of a sound research
protocol, it is extremely unlikely that experimentation will yield
any useful information, but rather will serve only to increase the
suffering and exploitation of desperate patients.
III. THE POLITICS OF AIDS DRUG TRIALS
The politics of AIDS has produced strange political alliances.
The anti-regulation Reagan and Bush administrations and the gay
community probably have only one interest in common: deregu-
lating the drug approval process.2 4 The gay community's posi-
tion is probably best summed up in a slogan used by ACT-UP
(AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power): "A Drug Trial is Health Care
Too. ' 25 The truth is otherwise: a drug trial is research designed
to test a hypothesis, not to help individual patients. The reason
for this strange alliance has little to do with shared love for those
suffering with AIDS, but rather is attributable to administrations
composed largely of free market advocates and the deregulation
22. Fletcher, The Evolution of the Ethics of Informed Consent, in RESEARCH ETH-
ics 211 (K. Berg & K. Tranoy eds. 1983).
23. G. ANNAS, THE RIGHTS OF PATIENTS 142 (2d ed. 1989). AIDS drug de-
velopment has been significantly hampered by lack of an animal that can be in-
fected with HIV. Chimpanzees can be infected, but do not become sick. They
are also an endangered species. Recently, two mice models have been devel-
oped which should provide an animal model in which to test potential AIDS
drugs prior to conducting human trials. For a discussion of the two mice mod-
els, see Leonard, Abramczuk, Pezen et al., Development of Disease and Virus Recovery
in Transgenic Mice Containing HIV Proviral DNA, 242 Sci. 1665 (1988); Namikawa,
Kaneshima, Lieberman & McCune, Infection of the SCID-hu Mouse by H1V-1, 242
Sci. 1684 (1988).
24. Kolata, Odd Alliance Would Speed New Drugs, N.Y. Times, Nov. 26, 1988,
at 9, col. 4. As one AIDS lawyer commented: "It's a very curious situation ...
[w]hen you find yourself in a position of articulating positions that are also being
put forth by the Competitive Enterprise Institute or the Heritage Foundation,
this is really bizarre." Id.
25. Why AIDS Activists Target the FDA, Village Voice, Oct. 18, 1988, at 25,
col. 1. See also Mainstream Strateg for AIDS Group, N.Y. Times, July 22, 1988, at
BI, col. 2, B4, col. 6 (ACT-UP is also involved "in extensive research to find
promising experimental drugs and treatment programs, and monitor progress
in drug trials").
778 [Vol. 34: p. 771
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lobbying of drug companies which see the AIDS epidemic as an
opportunity to further their own interests.
Unlike the treatment in Madame Bovary, research drugs are no
longer universally delivered free, and there is tremendous pres-
sure on the FDA to permit drug companies to sell "promising"
experimental drugs to subjects. The sale of experimental drugs
threatens to further erode the distinction between experimenta-
tion and therapy, and makes it even more difficult for patients
suffering from disease to distinguish recognized therapy from
early experimentation, and false hope from reasonable ex-
pectation.
The administration's position is that drugs should be permit-
ted to go on the market faster. President George Bush, while still
Vice-President, urged the FDA to develop procedures to expedite
the marketing of new drugs intended to treat AIDS and other life-
threatening illnesses.2" In his first debate with the Democratic
nominee, Michael Dukakis, President Bush said that in response
to his efforts the FDA had "sped up bringing drugs to market that
can help."2 7 However, the President did caution that "you've got
to be careful here because there's a safety factor." 28 Indeed there
should be a safety factor, and the policy question is whether it
should be ignored or radically lessened when the research sub-
jects have a fatal illness for which there is no cure. Although the
AIDS epidemic is new, this question is not. The FDA has faced it
squarely before.
In the 1970s, thousands of cancer victims were traveling to
Mexico and Canada to obtain laetrile, a substance derived from
apricot pits. The drug was not available in the United States and
was not even in experimental trials. In 1975, a group of termi-
nally ill cancer patients and their spouses sued the federal govern-
ment to enjoin it from interfering with the interstate shipment
and sale of laetrile.21- The FDA vigorously opposed making lae-
26. Investigational New Drug, Antibiotic and Biological Drug Product Reg-
ulations; Procedures for Drugs Intended to Treat Life-Threatening and Severely
Debilitating Illnesses; Interim Rule, 53 Fed. Reg. 41,515, 41,516 (1988) (to be
codified at 21 C.F.R. §§ 312, 314) [hereinafter Investigational New Drug Regu-
lations]. See also Leary, Panel Seeks to Streamline F.D.A. for Cancer and AIDS Drugs,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 5, 1989, at B12, col. 2 (panel of experts established at request
of President Bush is trying to find ways to speed approval process of drugs to
treat AIDS and cancer).
27. Transcript of the First TI' Debate Between Bush and Dukakis, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 26, 1988, at At 6, col. I.
28. Id.
29. United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544 (1979).
1989]
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trile available in the United States, even to terminally ill cancer
patients, because "there were no adequate well-controlled scien-
tific studies of Laetrile's safety or effectiveness. " 30
The United States Supreme Court in United States v. Ruther-
ford3 l upheld the FDA's position, noting, among other things,
that "[i]n implementing the statutory scheme, the FDA has never
made exception for drugs used by the terminally ill."32 The
Court also agreed with the FDA that effectiveness is not irrelevant
simply because a person is dying. The Rutherford Court stated:
"[E]ffectiveness does not necessarily denote capacity to cure. In
the treatment of any illness, terminal or otherwise, a drug is effec-
tive if it fulfills, by objective indices, its sponsor's claims of pro-
longed life, improved physical condition, or reduced pain." 33
The Court reasoned that safety is also relevant to the terminally
ill, stating that "[fWor the terminally ill, as for anyone else, a drug
is unsafe if its potential for inflicting death or physical injury is
not offset by the possibility of therapeutic benefit."3 4 The Court
emphasized that although the case involved laetrile, the logic
adopted applied to all unproven drugs:
To accept the proposition that the safety and efficacy
standards of the Act have no relevance for terminal pa-
tients is to deny the Commissioner's authority over all
drugs, however toxic or ineffectual, for such individuals.
If history is any guide, this new market would not be
long overlooked. Since the turn of the century, re-
sourceful entrepreneurs have advertised a wide variety
of purportedly simple and painless cures for cancer, in-
cluding liniments of turpentine, mustard, oil, eggs, and
ammonia; peat moss; arrangements of colored flood-
lamps; pastes made from glycerin and limburger cheese;
mineral tablets; and "Fountain of Youth" mixtures of
spices, oil, and suet.... Congress could reasonably have
determined to protect the terminally ill, no less than
other patients, from the vast range of self-styled pan-
30. Id. at 549. Laetrile's advocates accused the government of suppressing
a "cure" for cancer and of murdering cancer victims in their own experiments.
The basic arguments now being made by AIDS activists are the same that were
previously made by laetrile activists. See, e.g., G. GRIFFIN, WORLD WITHOUT CAN-
CER: TiH STORY OF VITAMIN B17 (1974).
31. 442 U.S. 544 (1979).
32. Id. at 553.
33. Id. at 555.
34. Id. at 555-56.
[Vol. 34: p. 771
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aceas that inventive minds can devise. 35
Since 1979, the FDA's public position on the use of unproven
drugs and devices in clinical settings has shifted. In 1985, for ex-
ample, the FDA decided to encourage the use of temporary artifi-
cial hearts, even though their use in clinical settings outside of a
planned research project could generate no scientifically useful
information about these devices.3 " The justification was that the
FDA should not stand in the way of a physician using an unap-
proved medical device in an "emergency. '" 3 7 In 1987, in response
to increasing political pressure to make experimental AIDS drugs
more widely available, the FDA issued new regulations that per-
mit the treatment use and sale of an investigational new drug
(IND) that is not otherwise approved for treatment and sale, while
the drug is still in clinical trials, if:
(i) The drug is intended to treat a serious or immedi-
ately life-threatening disease;
(ii) There is no comparable or satisfactory alternative
drug or other therapy available to treat that stage of the
disease in the intended patient population;
(iii) The drug is under investigation in a controlled
clinical trial under an IND in effect for the trial, or all
clinical trials have been completed; and
(iv) The sponsor of the controlled clinical trial is ac-
35. Id. at 557-58. The illusion that cancer can be cured by simply dedicat-
ing money and resources to this task, first proposed by Richard Nixon in his
"war on cancer," remains alive today. See Hammer, Funds are Lacking, Cancer is
Gaining, N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1989, at A17, col. 3.
36. Annas, Death and the .Mlagic ,achine: Infornmed Consent to the Artificial Heart,
9 W. NEw ENG. L. REV. 89, 107 (1987). See also Copeland, Levinson, Smith et al.,
The Total Artificial Heart as a Bridge to Transplantation: A Report of Two Cases, 256 J.
A.M.A. 2991, 2991 (1986) (These researchers' first attempt at using an artificial
heart as a "bridge" was with unapproved device.).
37. Annas, supra note 36, at 108. See also The Alan with the Illegal Heart, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 9, 1985, at 22, col. I (FDA regulates experimental medical devices
but artificial heart can be considered emergency treatment); Guidance for the
Emergency Use of Unapproved Medical Devices, Availability, 50 Fed. Reg.
42,865 (1985) (FDA does not object to use of unapproved potentially life-saving
medical device in emergency). The FDA established three preconditions for a
situation to be considered an emergency:
1. The patient is in a life-threatening condition that needs imme-
diate treatment;
2. No generally acceptable alternative for treating the patient is
available; and
3. Because of the immediate need to use the device, there is no




tively pursuing marketing approval of the investigational
drug with due diligence.
38
According to the counselor to the Undersecretary of Health
and Human Services, S. Jay Plager, the purpose of these new
rules is to give " 'desperately ill patients' the opportunity to de-
cide for themselves 'whether they would rather take an experi-
mental drug or die of the disease untreated.' "311 Like ACT-UP,
Mr. Plager and the FDA confuse experimentation with treatment
and seem so intent on denying death that they believe it can be
magically prevented with unproven drugs.
No one opposes cutting "red tape" or removing regulatory
hurdles that do not improve safety and efficacy. Arguably, the
FDA's rules are not inconsistent with Rutherford.40 But the FDA
38. Treatment Use of an Investigational New Drug, 21 C.F.R. § 312.34
(1988). See Young, Norris, Levitt & Nightingale, The FDA's Aew Procedures for the
Use of Investigational Drugs in Treatment, 259J. A.M.A. 2267, 2268 (1988).
39. Pear, U.S. to Allow Use of Trial Drugsfor AIDS and Other Terminal Ills, N.Y.
Times, May 21, 1987, at Al, col. 5. A year later these new rules were termed a
"failure" by the President's AIDS Commission which identified four reasons for
their nonuse:
[S]ome pharmaceutical companies are unwilling to allow their drugs to
be used in this program, even when they are sought after by physicians
and desperately ill patients;
there is no information system that allows the patient or physician pop-
ulation to know what is available;
methods of obtaining drugs that are available through this program are
poorly understood and seem unnecessarily complicated; and
some physicians are reluctant to prescribe treatment IND drugs be-
cause liability limits are not clearly defined.
REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE HUMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCY
VIRUS EPIDEMIC 50 (1988). As the Commission noted, in the first year of the
new rules, only one sponsor applied for and obtained approval for a treatment
IND for an HIV-related product. Id. See also Boffey, New Initiative to Speed AIDS
Drugs Is Assailed, N.Y. Times,July 5, 1988, at C1, col. 1, C9, col. 1 (AIDS commis-
sion described new program as "a failure because it had not produced drugs to
attack the AIDS virus directly").
40. The FDA provided the following explanation of why the new rules did
not conflict with Rutheford:
In Rutherford, the Court held that the new drug approval requirements
of the act applied to drugs intended to treat persons with terminal dis-
eases and upheld FDA's determination that Laetrile was an unapproved
new drug that could not be shipped in interstate commerce. However,
the treatment IND/protocol and sale provisions of the final rule are not
inconsistent with Rutheiford. The Court in Rutherford noted that applica-
tion of the new drug approval provisions to therapies for terminal dis-
eases did not foreclose resort to experimental drugs by patients for
whom conventional therapy was unavailable. The Court noted that the
act makes explicit provision for carefully regulated use of certain drugs
not yet demonstrated safe and effective. The final rule, while permil-
ting cost recovery for certain investigational drugs, maintains the prohi-
bition against commercialization distribution of a drug under an
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Commissioner took a step that clearly is inconsistent when, in July
1988, he announced that the FDA would permit United States cit-
izens to import unapproved drugs from abroad for their personal
use.4 1 In attempting to justify this policy, Commissioner Frank
Young said that "[t]here is such a degree of desperation, and peo-
ple are going to die, that I'm not going to be the Commissioner
that robs them of hope." 42 The reaction of the scientific commu-
nity to this new FDA position was well summed up in an article in
Science: "The new directive stunned some AIDS researchers. One
official in the federal government's AIDS Program went so far as
to suggest that the FDA commissioner had gone 'temporarily in-
sane.' "C' There are at least three reasons for this reaction.
First are all the arguments the FDA used in Rutherford to jus-
tify its central role as a consumer protection agency. All patients,
particularly terminally ill patients, deserve protection from profit
seekers who want to prey on their desperation. 44 People with
AIDS have a lot to lose, including their health, lives, dignity and
money. They can be and have been viciously exploited. Because
many victims of AIDS are members of disenfranchised groups
that have traditionally been rightfully suspicious of government's
view of them, they may be at special risk for exploitation by those
who proclaim that the government and orthodox medicine are in
approved treatment IND/protocol, therefore, continues to be a care-
fully regulated distribution. Treatment use of an investigational drug is
conditioned on the sponsor complying with all the safeguards inherent
in the IND process including informed consent, IRB review and the
applicable provisions of Part 312, such as distribution of the drug
through qualified experts, maintenance of adequate manufacturing fa-
cilities, and submission of IND safety reports. The treatment
IND/protocol provisions and the provisions for cost recovery, operat-
ing together, are consistent with the Court's opinion in Rutheford.
52 Fed. Reg. 19,465, 19,473 (1987) (citations omitted). For a discussion of
Rutheiford, see supra notes 29-35 and accompanying text.
41. Boffey, FDA ill Allow AIDS Patients to Import Uhnapproved Medicines, N.Y.
Times, July 24, 1988, at 1, col. 1. Up to three months supply can be imported,
and a physician's name must be given. Id.
42. Id.
43. Booth,An Uhndeiground Drugfor AIDS, 249 SCIENCE 1279 (1988). Donald
Abrams, an AIDS researcher at San Francisco General Hospital, commented
that "[tihe FDA is saying: 'We can't regulate anymore. So who cares? Let the
patients take whatever they want! Just get them off our backs.' " Id.
44. Approximately $1 billion is now being spent annually on bogus AIDS
treatments in the United States alone. There are hundreds of quack doctors
peddling half-truths, false hopes and potentially lethal treatments. In the words
of John Renner of the National Council Against Health Fraud, "[tihere is an
entire world of mischief and hucksterism out there ... spreading disinformation,
panic and fear." Manmaney, Quan, Ard & Wright, Preying on AIDS Patients,
NEWSWEEK, June 1, 1987, at 52.
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a conspiracy to deny them treatment. 45
A few examples of harm to individuals from unapproved
drugs illustrate the problem. The life and death of Bill Kraus
frames Randy Shilts' chronicle of the politics of AIDS, And The
Band Played On.4 t" Kraus, like many other AIDS patients, including
Rock Hudson (who left Paris in 1984 convinced he was cured of
AIDS), traveled to Paris to be treated with HPA-23. When, in
1985, it became clear that the drug was not working, Kraus' doc-
tor urged him to start taking isoprinosine, another unproven
medication. Shilts writes: "The suggestion upset Bill because he
had pinned his entire hope for survival on HPA-23. Even the pos-
sibility that it might not be a panacea enraged him, cutting to the
core of his denial and bargaining with his AIDS diagnosis.
' '47
More than five years later, the efficacy of HPA-23 is still in doubt,
and obviously the failure to prove or disprove its worth in France
cannot be blamed on the FDA's regulations.
Suramin, which has been widely used to treat African sleep-
ing sickness, was discovered to disable HIV's ability to replicate in
the test tube. When the test tube information was made public
45. See J. YOUNG, TIlE MEDICAL MESSIAHS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF HEALTH
QUACKERY IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 428 (1967). Professor Young ex-
plores the reasons why people subscribe to quack remedies and states:
The poorly educated do after all pay most of the bills. Among them is a
group motivated, it would seem, by something more than sheer lack of
knowledge. Some sort of alienation, some sort of perversity, drives
these people to follow the most extreme pathways. Often they share
with others not so far out as themselves a deep resentment against or-
thodox authority.
Id.
46. R. SHILrS, supra note 21.
47. Id. at 562. Shilts notes that "[a]bout 100 Americans were part of the
AIDS exile community in Paris, making long daily treks to Percy Hospital on the
edge of the city for their shots of HPA-23." Id. at 563. Shilts also notes that as
early as 1983 the amino acid clinics in Mexico were making
a killing from desperate AIDS victims seeking a reprieve from their
death sentences. The fact that you had to leave the country for treat-
ments rejected by the medical establishment only made them seem all
the more tantalizing. Patients recently diagnosed with a fatal illness
tended not to be wild about anything that smacked of official medicine.
Id. at 240-4 1.
Others are beginning to tell similar stories. Chris Clason, founder of the
Test Positive Aware support group in Chicago, says:
People get all jazzed up about the next drug to come down the chute,
do whatever they need to do to get it, and then find out a couple of
years later that it's not very appropriate or effective .... Then they get
depressed and wish they hadn't sold the condo . . .[but when the next
drug comes along] they jump back on the roller coaster.
Cotton, Easing Import Difficulties Iasn ' Provided Panacea, Med. World News, Apr.
10, 1989, at 36, col. 3.
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and the drug touted as "promising," many patients wanted it.
However, a subsequent trial in humans found that the drug was
extremely toxic in AIDS patients, worsening immune disorders
and thus hastening death. 48 French researchers announced to the
world that they had cured AIDS using cyclosporine. 4 1 There was
a clamor for the drug, and the announcement was later found to
be premature hype when both patients became comatose and the
drug did not improve their clinical course. In late 1987, a Zairian
scientist announced in a news conference that he had a possible
cure for AIDS. In the aftermath of the announcement, the
number of men in Zaire who believed AIDS could be cured
doubled to fifty-seven percent and educational efforts aimed at
prevention were set back.
51
The lack of scientifically sound, carefully planned, random-
ized clinical trials not only produces false hope, but can also di-
rectly lengthen the time it will take to get a truly effective AIDS
drug to those suffering from the disease. One of the most prom-
ising AIDS drugs, ampligen, had been backed for clinical testing
by Du Pont, which had committed as much as $25 million to its
study. In October 1988, the trials were halted when it appeared
to do no better than a placebo. However, in January 1989, its
primary developer announced that it thought the drug had been
prematurely abandoned, saying that the poor results could be at-
tributed to the haste in which the relatively large batch of the
drug was manufactured and shipped over long distances. New
trials may start later in 1989.
51
48. Eckholm, Should the Rules Be Bent in an Epidemic?, N.Y. Times, July 13,
1986, at E30, col. 1; See also Levy, Ethical Dilemma of Placebo-Controlled Trials in Life-
Threatening Illnesses, 2 J. CLINICAL RES. & DRUG DEV. 145, 151 (1988) (reviews
basic principles of ethical clinical research design for experimental treatment of
life-threatening illnesses and applies them to AZT context).
49. Clark, Lerner & Stadtman, AIDS: A 'Breakthrough'?, NEWSWEEK, Nov.
I1, 1985, at 88.
50. Brooke, In Zaire, AIDS Awareness vs. Preventioi, N.Y. Times, Oct. 10,
1988, at B4, col. 1.
51. Andrews, 3 New Drugs Backed for AIDS Study, N.Y. Times,Jan. 7, 1989, at
36, col. I. See Hays, Du Pont's Big Dive To Euter Drug Field Proves Disappointing,
Wall St. J., Jan. 16, 1989, at A1, col. 6. The ampligen story has become even
more complex as details of charges and countercharges appear in the press. The
rights to ampligen were held by a small, private biotechnology firm in Philadel-
phia, Pennsylvania, called HEM Research Inc. Id. at AI0, col. 2. One of the
drug's developers, and chairman of the company, had sought out Du Pont as a
partner to develop the drug. Id. Although the drug had been tried on only 10
patients (whose immune systems it seemed to stabilize without serious side ef-
fects), Du Pont nonetheless agreed to become a partner, acquiring six percent of
HEM's stock for $10 million and agreeing to finance part of a 300 person clinical
trial of ampligen. Id. at A10, col. 3. In retrospect, after the failure of the trials,
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The second reason why encouraging the use of unproven
drugs is bad public policy is that denying death ultimately serves
no purpose (other than providing temporary false reassurance).
The FDA and other federal agencies (like the Centers for Disease
Control) have recognized this in other aspects of the AIDS epi-
demic. For example, rather than continue to deny that teenagers
are engaging in sexual activity, condom use and "safe sex" prac-
tices have been recommended to help prevent the spread of
AIDS. Similarly, education about the science and epidemiology
of AIDS has been used as the major weapon to fight fear and prej-
udice against those infected by others who would deny them edu-
cation, housing, employment and insurance. 52 The scientificfacts
have been seen as the most powerful weapon against fear bred by
ignorance. It is thus at least ironic that attention to scientific facts
seems to have been jettisoned when it has come to research with
AIDS drugs. It is not compassionate to hold out false hope to
terminally ill patients so that they spend their last dollar on un-
proven "remedies" that they might live longer. If anything, such
a strategy seems aimed primarily at treating the guilt of a society
that has done little to meet the real needs of AIDS victims by giv-
ing us the illusion that we are doing something to help.
The third reason why making unproven drugs available is
poor public policy is that if unproven remedies are made easily
available it will be impossible to do scientifically valid trials of new
drugs. Those suffering from AIDS will be unwilling to participate
in randomized clinical trials, and those who are randomized to an
the Du Pont manager in charge conceded the experience was "a good lesson for
anybody in this business that early data from uncontrolled studies in small num-
bers of people can be very misleading." Id. HEM's chief executive has since
been fired, and in a lawsuit which he filed over his dismissal, the company has
counterclaimed, alleging that the former chief executive not only improperly
designed the drug trials, but also that he sold HEM stock valued at approxi-
mately $70,000 to a desperate AIDS patient for $1,000,000 so that the AIDS
patient and his friend would be added to the ampligen clinical trial. Id. at Al,
col. 1, A10, col. 3. HEM alleges that the $1 million was deposited in the former
chairman's personal bank account. Id. at AI0, col. 3. The former chairman's
attorney does not deny the facts, but says "[tihe complaint is an exercise in tak-
ing certain facts and matters which individually are correct and reorganizing
them or omitting them to leave one with the incorrect impressions." Id. See also
lolata, Poor Results Bring End to Anti-AIDS Drug Study, N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 1988,
at A13, col. I ("People carrying the virus who took ampligen developed AIDS at
least as often as patients taking an inert substance.").
52. For a discussion of the use of education about the scientific facts of
AIDS to combat fear and discrimination, see R. BAYER, PRIVATE ACTS, SOCIAL
CONSEQUENCES: AIDS AND THE POLITICS OF PUBLIC HEALTH (1989); AIDS AND
THE LAW: A GUIDE FOR THE PUBLIC (H. Dalton, S. Burris & the Yale AIDS Law
Project eds. 1987).
786 [Vol. 34: p. 771
1989] AIDS DRUG TRIALS 787
arm of the study they do not like will take the drugs they "believe
in" on the sly, making any valid finding from the study
impossible.
5 3
More recently, in what gay rights activists described as a
political ploy in the midst of a presidential campaign, the FDA
developed rules designed to permit the collapsing of phases II
and 11154 for certain drugs "intended to treat ... life-threatening
or severely-debilitating illnesses." 55  In announcing the new
rules, Commissioner Frank Young said: "I've seen a lot of folks
who are suffering, and I want those people who have either cancer
or AIDS to know that this agency has a heart as well as a mind."-
5 6
However, these new rules do little more than formalize proce-
53. See, e.g., Kolata, Recruiting Problems in New York Slowing U.S. Trials of AIDS
Drug, N.Y. Times, Dec. 18, 1988, at 1, col. 4. Not only is there a problem in
recruiting AIDS patients to participate in drug trials, but there is the additional
problem that those who do join studies may continue to take other "under-
ground" drugs on the side, thus invalidating the results of the study. Id. at 46,
col. 1. Nonetheless, as ofJanuary 1, 1989, there were 5,531 patients enrolled in
57 National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases AIDS protocols across
the country. Staver, HI V-Infected Patients Turn to Aerosol Pentamidine, Am. Med.
News, Jan. 6, 1989, at 11, col. 2. At least one organization, New York's People
with AIDS Health Group, will help AIDS patients import the drugs they want.
Kolata, Group IVill Import Unapproved Drugs for Treating AIDS, N.Y. Times, Mar. 6,
1989, at 1, col. 5.
54. For a discussion of the three phases of human testing to determine if a
drug is safe and effective, see Investigational New Drug Regulations, supra note
26, at 41,518. The three phases are:
Phase I with 10 to 50 patients to study how the drug is tolerated, me-
tabolized, and excreted; phase 2 with 50 to 200 patients in which the
safety and efficacy of the drug are first evaluated in controlled trials;
and phase 3 with 200 to 1,000 or more patients to confirm and expand
upon the safety and efficacy data obtained from the first two phases.
Id. The new rules are premised on the principle that "[i]f ... the evidence
obtained from well-planned and well-executed phase 2 research is sufficient
under the statute for marketing approval, there may be no need for additional
phase 3 premarket testing, and the drug can become available much more rap-
idly than usual." Id. at 41,519. For general discussion of the FDA's drug rules,
see Kessler, The Regulation of Investigational Drugs, 320 NEW ENG. J. MED. 281
(1989).
55. Investigational New Drug Regulations, supra note 26, at 41,516. While
some AIDS activists condemned the new rules as mere windowdressing in the
midst of the presidential campaign, others, like Barry Gingell of the Gay Men's
Health Crisis, argued that the new rules should be mandator, with respect to drug
companies, forcing them to cooperate with the FDA to get experimental drugs
in the hands of treating physicians as soon as possible. In his words, "I think its
[sic] crazy this program is voluntary.... Companies should be required by law
to design streamlined studies." Waldholz, Drug Firms Hope FDA Broadens Plan to
Speed Approval of Some Medicines, Wall St. J., Oct. 21, 1988, at B3, cols. 3, 4.
56. Silver, FDA Offers Plan to Speed Process of Drug Approval, Boston Globe,
Oct. 20, 1988, at 3, col. 1. This maneuver reportedly led President Bush to
decide to keep Young on as FDA Commissioner. Mahar, Pitiless Scourge: Separat-
ing Out the IHype from Hope on AIDS, BARRON'S, Mar. 13, 1989, at 6, 22.
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
dures the FDA has always been able to use upon the request of
the manufacturer. As the FDA notes in the comments to the
rules, they essentially track the way the FDA actually went about
approving AZT, still the only drug the FDA has approved for the
treatment of AIDS.
57
57. Investigational New Drug Regulations, supra note 26, at 41,519. How-
ever, the approval process for azidothymidine (AZT) remains problematic, and
we will probably never be able to determine just how effective this drug is for
most people suffering from AIDS. This is because the only randomized clinical
trial of AZT was terminated before it could be completed because it was found
that while only one person receiving AZT had died, 19 on the placebo arm had
died. The study involved 282 AIDS patients who either had Pneumocystis carinii
pneumonia alone or had advanced AIDS-related complex (ARC). They were
randomized to AZT or placebo, each taken every four hours, 24 hours a day.
Treatment was to last 24 weeks, but when the study was terminated, only 27
subjects had completed the entire 24 weeks of treatment. The researchers con-
cluded that AZT could prolong survival in this patient population, but that
"[flurther studies will be needed to define the optimal dose of AZT and to un-
derstand the full range of benefit in the various stages of HIV infection." Fischl,
Richman, Grieco et al., The Efficacy of Azidothymidine (AZT) in the Treatment of Pa-
tients with AIDS and AIDS-Related Complex, 317 NEW ENG. J. MED. 185, 191 (1987)
[hereinafter The Efficacy of AZT].
AZT, however, is not without adverse side effects, and 21% of AZT recipi-
ents in this study developed such severe bone marrow suppression that they
required multiple transfusions and had to be discontinued from the drug. Rich-
man, Fischl, Grieco et al., The Toxicity of Azidothymidine (AZT) in the Treatment of
Patients with AIDS and AIDS-Related Complex, 317 NEW ENG. J. MED. 192, 194
(1987) [hereinafter The Toxicity of AZT]. Approving AZT for treatment on the
strength of this very limited randomized clinical trial (RCT) has made it difficult
to accurately determine AZT's actual effects although it does seem to prolong
survival. Creagh-Kirk, Doi, Andrews et al., Survival Experience Among Patients with
AIDS Receiving Zidovudine: Followup of Patients in a Compassionate Plea Program, 260
J. A.M.A. 3009, 3010 (1988) [hereinafter Survival Experience]. Forty percent of
those taking AZT, however, develop anemia requiring dose reduction or trans-
fusion, and only 60% of all patients are able to tolerate AZT for more than one
year. Bartlett, HIt Therapeutics: An Emerging Science, 260 J. A.M.A. 3051, 3051
(1988). See also Schmitt, Bigley, McKinnis et al., Neuropsychological Outcome of
Zidovudine (AZT) Treatment of Patients with AIDS and AIDS-Related Complex, 319 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1573 (1988) (reporting improved cognition and significant reduc-
tion in intensity of symptomatic distress in recipients of AZT).
It is probably not possible to approve a drug faster than the FDA approved
AZT. Although developed as a cancer drug in 1964, it was rarely used. In 1985,
its antiviral possibilities were recognized at the NIH, and a Phase I trial was
completed there and at Duke University. In early 1986, a Phase II trial was con-
ducted at 12 medical centers, which resulted in the Fischl study discussed in The
Efficacy of AZT and The Toxicity of AZT. Bartlett, supra, at 3051. While this study
was being evaluated, the FDA permitted other physicians to prescribe AZT
under a "compassionate use" treatment investigational new drug exemption.
The Creagh-Kirk study, described in Survival Experience, followed these patients.
Survival Experience, supra, at 3009. Phase III was essentially replaced with infor-
mal "monitoring" of patients receiving the drug. Although it was predicted that
AZT would soon be replaced by a less toxic and more effective drug, this has not
happened. "[AZT's] future appears bright due to the paucity of alternative an-
tiviral agents with similar efficacy and acceptable toxicity .... Bartlett, supra, at
3052. See also Yarchoan, Mitsuya & Broder, AIDS Therapies, Sci. AM., Oct. 1988,
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IV. SHOULD THE RULES FOR RESEARCH BE CHANGED WHEN THE
DISEASE Is FATAL?
Randomized clinical trials (RCT) are the "gold standard"
upon which experimental treatments are judged useful, worthless
or dangerous. 58 John McKinlay has demonstrated that in the ab-
sence of an initial well-controlled clinical trial the typical innova-
tion in modern medicine goes through seven stages:
(1) promising report; (2) professional and organizational adop-
tion; (3) public acceptance and state (third-party) endorsement;
(4) standard procedure and observational reports; (5) random-
ized clinical trial; (6) professional denunciation; and (7) erosion
at 110 (key to new treatments for AIDS is finding antiretroviral drug with less
toxicity than AZT).
Aerosolized pentamidine was given FDA approval for wider experimental
use in early 1989 when it seemed likely that the drug was effective in prevention
Pneumocystis carinii pneumonia in AIDS patients. The company which has exclu-
sive rights to market the drug, however, has a checkered history with the FDA.
LyphoMed was forced to close its Florida facility last year, and at its Chicago
plant, where aerosolized pentamidine is manufactured, FDA inspectors found
violations of "good manufacturing practice" so severe that the company volun-
tarily agreed to curtail production radically in May 1988 to try to bring the plant
into compliance. In late 1988 the company was permitted to resume normal
production. FDA's Dr. Ellen Cooper says of putting sole responsibility for the
manufacture of a life-saving drug into the hands of a company with this poor
track record: "It's not our job to say, 'This is a B-minus drug company, so we're
going to wait and give approval to an A company.' " In fact, it appears that there
is no communication between the drug approval arm of the FDA and its field
inspectors of manufacturing plants. Mahar, Pitiless Scourge, supra note 56, at 24.
LyphoMed is pricing the spray at $100 a dose or $1200 a year, compared to a
French company that makes it available in England for $28 a dose. Id. at 22.
The FDA has also decided to make ganciclovir, used for treating peripheral
cytomegalovirus retinitis, available on a compassionate plea protocol. Staver,
FDA Oks Conipassionate Plea for AIDS Drug; Trials Continue, Am. Med. News, Mar.
17, 1989, at 14, col. 1. But see Erice, Chou & Biron, Progressive Disease Due to
Ganciclovir-Resistant Cvtomegalovirus in Immunocompromised Patients, 320 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 289 (1989).
58. See, e.g., R. LEVINE, ETHICS AND REGULATION OF CLINICAL RESEARCH 211
(2d ed. 1986) ("At the time of this writing, the RCT is the gold standard for
evaluating therapeutic efficacy."). Clinical trials of drugs are loosely divided into
three phases. Phase I trials are small and are intended to identify the drug's
toxicity in humans. Phase II trials continue the toxicity study, but are aimed
primarily at establishing dosage ranges in a small population of humans. Only
in Phase III is the drug actually tested for efficacy, usually using a large number
of patients in a randomized clinical trial in which half get the investigational new
drug, and half get either a placebo or the conventional treatment drug. The arm
of the trial to which each patient is assigned is chosen at random. If neither the
patient nor the physician know what drug the patient-subject is receiving, the
trial is "double blind." There is, of course, nothing inherently magical about
the three phases, and equally valid methods of testing drugs for safety and effi-
cacy could certainly be developed. For a further discussion of human testing,
see supra note 54 and accompanying text.
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and discreditation. 59 McKinlay has argued forcefully that to avoid
the first four stages, and the last two, as well as the expense in
terms of money and human misery that they generate, we must
evaluate all newly proposed therapies at stage (5), the random-
ized clinical trial, before making the therapy generally available.
60
This view is widely endorsed in the scientific community. 6 1 The
trend has been to try to develop methods to evaluate surgery and
other therapies by RCT as well, in an effort to improve the quality
of care by eliminating costly therapies that provide no benefit.
Although there are proposals for "community clinical trials"'52
59. McKinlay, From "Promising Report" to "Standard Procedure'". Seven Stages in
the Career of a Aledical Innovation, 59 MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q 374, 376-98
(1981).
60. Id. at 402. In a randomized clinical trial, a new drug is compared with a
placebo or other drug, each being assigned at random to comparable patients.
In a double blind study, neither the physician nor the patient knows who is get-
ting the new drug and who is getting the placebo.
61. In the words of Samuel Broder, the New Director of the National Can-
cer Institute, commenting on AIDS patients taking unproven drugs: "People
must remember that individual self-experimentation is extremely unlikely to
yield meaningful results .... The only way to know whether or not a drug really
works is to put it through a series of carefully controlled and scientifically sound
clinical trials." Booth, supra note 43, at 1279. See also Boffey, At Fulcrum of Con-
flict, Regulator of AIDS Drugs, N.Y. Times, Aug. 19, 1988, at A13, col. 1 (noting
conflict between scientists who seek well-controlled studies and AIDS sufferers
who seek immediate access to drugs).
62. Halpert, ComnmunitV Facilities to Do AIDS Research, Boston Globe, Nov. 23,
1988, at 12, col. 1. See also Abraham, NIH Looks to Community Physicians for AIDS
Research, Am. Med. News, Dec. 9, 1988, at 3, col. 1 (researchers carrying out
community-based clinical trials are more able to find subjects and can conduct
less scientifically and technologically intense studies with wider spectrum of
AIDS sufferers); Kolata, Doctors and Patients Take AIDS Drug Trial Into Their Own
Hands, N.Y. Times, Mar. 15, 1988, at C3, col. 1 (community Research Initiative
"believes it can identify useful drugs far more quickly than more formal univer-
sity-based trials can").
The American Foundation for AIDS Research (AmFAR) publishes a regu-
larly updated directory entitled "AIDS/HIV Experimental Treatment Directory"
which, among other things, lists where various experimental treatments are
available across the country. Page ii of the directory contains the following
warning in bold print: "No representation, warranty or endorsement, expressed
or implied, is made as to the validity or success of any of the treatments. This
information is provided to you as source material only, has not been verified,
and should not be relied upon as being accurate." The directory is available
from AmFAR, 1515 Broadway, Suite 3601, New York, NY 10036-8901.
Larry Kramer expressed his rage to the gay community about RCTs, which
he denotes as "double blind," in the following words:
Let's talk about double-blind studies that we're forced to endure. Did
you know that double-blind studies were not created originally for ter-
minal illnesses? I never knew that. Did you know that? How dare they,
then, make us endure double-blind studies? They are ludicrously inhu-
mane when two-thirds of this room could be dead in less than five
years.
Double-blind studies are also exceptionally foolish, because PWAs
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and for "adjustments" in the current management of RCTs, 63
there is little dispute that the RCT is the method most likely to
produce valid results. 64
When Commissioner Young says that the FDA "has a heart
as well as a mind," 65 it is fair to ask whether the FDA's role is to
provide emotional support or scientific protection to the public.
The FDA may see it as compassionate to provide access to un-
[persons with AIDS] lie to get the drugs. I'd lie. Wouldn't you? If they
told me what to say to get a promising treatment, I'd say it, whether it
was true or not. I have friends who have forged their medical records,
who have gone to medical libraries to learn the correct terminology to
fill in the blanks. So all the results from all these double-blind studies
aren't going to tell anyone a thing. We're willing to be guinea pigs, all
of us. Give us the fucking drugs!
L. KRAMER, supra note 21, at 132 (1989).
Of course, new AIDS drugs should be compared to AZT in RCTs, not to a
placebo, at least for those who can tolerate AZT.
63. Goyan, Drug Regulation: Quo Vadis?, 260 J. A.M.A. 3052, 3053 (1988).
Jere Goyan, who is a former FDA Commissioner, argues that the changes the
FDA has made to date amount primarily to speeding the procedure for drug
approval, but not to making any changes in it. Id. Goyan challenges the entire
procedure itself when he states that
our system needs much more than adjustment of the present process.
It is time for us to consider the bases on which the current process was
developed. In particular, we need to consider alternative study designs
that allow the patient maximum hope for cure and the opportunity for
some control over his or her destiny.
Id. But see Oates & Wood, The Regulation of Discovery and Drug Development, 320
NEw ENG. J. MED. 311, 312 (1989) ("The quality of evidence obtained in ran-
domized controlled trials allows physicians and patients to make rational deci-
sions about treatment. Real freedom of choice in therapy derives from evidence
that permits an informed choice.").
64. Nevertheless, it is this method of drug evaluation that is under attack.
See, e.g., Mitchell & Steingrub, The Changing Clinical Trials Scene: The Role of the
IRB, 10 I.R.B.,July/Aug. 1988, at 1, 2 (controlled clinical trial is essential inves-
tigative tool).
The RCT is not totally without its critics. Some allege, for example, that it
is too pure for actual medical practice, which does not follow precise inclusion
rules nor precise dosages. Others think that, especially in the case of a univer-
sally fatal disease like AIDS, historical controls can be used instead of controls
treated with either a placebo or AZT.
In a clinical trial using historical controls, control data are derived from
the experience of the institution with the treatment of the disease in
question accumulated before the introduction of the new therapy. Var-
iants on this approach involve the use of literature controls (control
data derived from publications on the outcomes of treatment with the
best available standard therapy) and the use of control data developed
in the conduct of other clinical trials. The strongest defense of the use
of historical controls can be made when the disease in question has a
uniformly lethal outcome when untreated and for which there is no ef-
fective therapy.
R. LEVINE, supra note 58, at 209-10.
65. Silver, supra note 56, at 3, col. I.
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proven remedies, but less than a decade ago it saw it as exploita-
tive. Was the FDA right ten years ago, or is it right today?
I hope no one is surprised at this point that I think the FDA
was correct on laetrile and should continue to insist on a scientifi-
cally valid randomized clinical trial before certifying drugs safe
and effective. All consumer protection legislation is to some de-
gree paternalistic; but in this case it is also realistic. FDA certifica-
tion of the safety and efficacy of drugs recognizes that the public
is in no position to judge the value or usefulness of many medica-
tions and that many are dangerous and have serious side effects
(which is one reason we also license physicians and require some
drugs be available only upon a physician's prescription). Further-
more, drug manufacturers have another social role: to create and
sell new products. Their role is not consumer protection.
66
Libertarians and those with extreme views of individual au-
tonomy, and even some free marketers, object to FDA regulation,
equating "pursuit of quackery" with "life, liberty, and the pursuit
of happiness."' 6 7 True autonomy requires adequate and accurate
information upon which to base decisions. This is simply impos-
sible in the absence of responsible scientific study and properly
designed clinical trials. It is appropriate to concentrate energies
and resources in the time of an epidemic. It is also appropriate to
assign AIDS drug testing a very high priority and to assure ade-
quate governmental funding for the development and testing of
drugs that might be effective. 68 It is also appropriate for the NIH
and the FDA to work together more closely and to develop better
dispute resolution systems when disagreements persist and delay
66. SeeJ. YOUNG, supra note 45, at 410-12.
67. See Colen, Laetrile Dispute Focuses Attention on Patients Rights, Wash. Post,
May 29, 1977, at 1, col. 6; see also Annas, AIDS, Judges, and the Right to Medical Care,
HASTINGS CENTER REP., Aug./Sept. 1988, at 20, 21 ("There is no constitutional
right to medical care, even to medical care that is lifesaving.").
68. NIH, for example, has blamed delays on staff shortages, though it might
be their own fault that these staff shortages exist. See Boffey, Official Blames
Shortage of Staff For Delay in Testing AIDS Drugs, N.Y. Times, Apr. 30, 1988, at 1,
col. 2. But see Knox, US is Stifling Development of AIDS Drugs, Senators Told, Boston
Globe, July 14, 1988, at 18, col. I (Commissioner Young said that his "agency
could use at least 50 scientists above its fiscal 1989 complement to speed evalua-
tion of AIDS drugs."); Kramer, An Open Letter to Dr. Anthony Fauci, Village Voice,
May 31, 1988, at 18, col. 3 (problem is not staff shortages, but bureaucratic in-
competence of Dr. Anthony Fauci, Director of National Institute of Allergy and
Infectious Diseases). Regular review of FDA policies by outside experts is also
reasonable to prevent the FDA from becoming "insular" and losing touch with
new developments in testing methodologies. See Altman, Aainstream Medicine
Joins Growing Debate About Drug Approval, N.Y. Times, Dec. 6, 1988, at C3, cols. 1,
4.
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drug research. 69 But it is not appropriate or ultimately helpful to
AIDS sufferers to rush inadequately tested drugs to market. The
thalidomide episode taught us all that lesson, 70 and our brief ex-
perience with suramin should have reinforced it.71
The good news is that even with the "faith, hope and charity"
rhetoric of the Commissioner, with the exception of permitting
the importation of quack remedies for personal use, the FDA has
actually stuck with its consumer protection role. Its two major
rule innovations are designed primarily to speed the bureaucratic
aspects of drug testing rather than to substantively change the
rules for evaluating drugs. This is perfectly consistent with sound
public policy. But it would not be in the public interest if the FDA
adopted the anti-regulation agenda of the drug companies by re-
laxing its safety and efficacy standards.
The rhetoric is being turned up and is a repeat of the laetrile
debate. For example, a Wall Street Journal editorial accused the
FDA of killing people with its testing procedures, and called on
the FDA to give in to the demands of dying patients rather than to
insist on scientific soundness in experimentation and to let the
"patients and their families" be involved in revamping the cur-
rent system for drug approval:
Let defenders of the status quo explain to people with
cancer, Alzheimer's or AIDS why redundant efficacy test-
ing, in which half the patients get a placebo, doesn't con-
stitute "killing" in the name of FDA-mandated medical
statistics ....
AIDS patients have driven home to the U.S.
medical and political establishment what enormous risks
human beings in death's grip will take to gain relief or
respite.
7 2
69. See, e.g., Scientific .Vecessity, Patient's Rights, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan.
23, 1989, at 50-51 (some scientists feel FDA has relaxed rules too much while
patient groups are clamoring for further relaxation of drug approval rules).
70. THE INSIGHT TEAM OF THE SUNDAY TIMES OF LONDON, SUFFER THE
CHILDREN: THE STORY OF THALIDOMIDE (1979). Thalidomide was a tranquiliz-
ing pill that was said to be nontoxic, with no side effects and safe for pregnant
women. The drug poisoned thousands of babies who were born with terrible
handicaps. Id.
71. For a discussion of suramin, see supra note 48 and accompanying text.
72. NVew Ideasfor New Drugs, Wall St.J., Dec. 28, 1988, at A6, cols. 1, 2. The
drug approval process would be much more rational if the NIH, which produces
drugs and performs clinical trials, and the FDA, which approves drugs, worked
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What the Journal does not realize is that it has identified the
problem-desperation-not the solution. Deregulation of the drug
approval process cannot produce new drugs that do not exist. Of
course, money can be made by exploiting the fear of death and
desperation, and perhaps this is what the Journal would like to see.
The continued insistence of Burroughs Wellcome to make AZT
available only to those who can pay approximately $8,000 a year
for its use, long after the original justification (to recoup develop-
ment costs) for this extraordinarily high price has been met, is a
useful example of such financial exploitation. 73 No wonder that
the American Public Health Association has petitioned the United
States Department of Health and Human Services to require
mechanisms be put into place to ensure that, if and when a drug
more effective in combatting AIDS is developed at government
institutions or with federal funding, it will be made available at
the lowest possible price.74 The quest for profit also threatens to
inhibit scientific research and the sharing of data on experimental
AIDS drugs, as well as to increase the likelihood that useless
drugs will be hyped in press conferences rather than discussed at
scientific meetings. 75 This trend is much more likely to adversely
together to set priorities. See Leary, supra note 26; Waldholz, supra note 55, at
B3, col. 1.
73. See, e.g., Forcing Poverty on AIDS Patients, N.Y. Times, Aug. 30, 1988, at
A18, cols. 1, 2 ("A drug company should not usually have to justify its profit, but
AZT is a special case."). See also Lambert, 6,000 AIDS Patients Face Cutoff of Drug
that May Prolong Lives, N.Y. Times, Aug. 24, 1988, at Al, col. 1 (expiration of
federal grant money allocated to helping certain AIDS patients gain access to
AZT will jeopardize ability of 6,000 patients throughout country to obtain life-
prolonging treatment).
Financial journals suggest that it is likely that Burroughs Wellcome recov-
ered its approximately $86 million in development costs involving AZT in the
first year of its sales, and that even after a 20% price cut "the drug will continue
to yield an appreciable profit." Mahar, supra note 56, at 20.
74. Boffey, Federal Control Urged to Keep Costs Down on AIDS-Related Drugs,
N.Y. Times, Aug. 24, 1988, at BI0, col. 1. Drug companies themselves will be-
come increasingly difficult to regulate as the trend toward consolidation and
merger in the $127 billion global industry continues. Koenig & Lublin, Global
Drug Industy Appears to Be Headedfor Big Consolidation, Wall St. J., Apr. 13, 1989, at
1, col. 6.
75. See, e.g., Altman, Cooperation vs. Competition, N.Y. Times, Apr. 14, 1987, at
C2, cols. 4, 5 ("[Rlelease of data was often restricted by the commercial interests
of not only for-profit bitechnology companies, with their patent concerns, but
also some not-for-profit medical journals, which for competitive reasons may
penalize researchers who disclose too many details before publication."); Fore-
man, Secrecy in AIDS Research, Boston Globe, Apr. 13, 1987, at 43, col. 4.
Wall Street, however, seems far less bullish on AIDS drugs in 1989 than it
did just two years ago. Compare, for example, a front page Wall Street Journal
article describing how AIDS has an appeal "reminiscent of the now-cooled ardor
money men had for the microchip businesses of Silicon Valley. Venture capital-
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affect AIDS sufferers than any FDA rule regarding clinical trials.
More importantly, drug companies are likely to continue to
lobby Congress and the public to limit their liability for harm
caused by dangerous drugs by eliminating the possibility of recov-
ery for punitive damages when FDA standards have been fol-
lowed, or by limiting liability for harm caused by vaccines. 76
AIDS activists may be tempted to join the drug companies and
the free marketers on these moves as well, at least if the drug
companies promise more work on AIDS drugs and vaccines in
return. But just as drug approval standards should not be driven
solely by the AIDS epidemic, so policies for compensating the vic-
tims of drug injuries should not be driven by the AIDS epidemic.
We should not forget why we have rules for drug safety.
77
The distinction between experimentation and therapy is a
powerfully useful and protective one that should not be under-
mined. The fact that there is no cure for a fatal disease does not
make experimental drugs designed for it therapeutic, any more
than a mechanical or baboon heart is therapeutic for someone
with end stage heart disease. 78 Experimental drugs are not a con-
sumer good appropriately governed by the free market. If con-
sumer choice were the only relevant issue, even if it were limited
to terminally ill consumers, the drug of choice among most dying
intravenous drug users with AIDS would likely be heroin or other
opiate derivatives such as morphine. These drugs are effective in
relieving pain and anxiety in this population, and if delivered with
clean needles in a medical setting, could also be safe. If we really
wanted to make drugs a consumer good for the terminally ill, we
should begin here. The fact that we do not indicates that the
ists are pouncing on all manner of AIDS enterprises, lavishing millions on pri-
vate projects to diagnose, treat, prevent or cure the disease," Chase, Venture
Capitalists See Ways to M1lake illoney in Combating AIDS, Wall St.J., Sept. 28, 1987, at
1, col. 6, with a more recent article in Bar-on's that begins, "AIDS is a short ....
Wall Street has cooled on AIDS drugs over the past year ... in part because a
goodly number of [investors] have already been burned by the hype that inevita-
bly accompanies any well-advertised scourge," Mahar, Petitless Scourge, supra note
56, at 6, col. 1-2.
76. There is at least some irony in the argument on the one hand that AIDS
patients "have nothing to lose" and so cannot be hurt, and on the other that the
possibility of being sued by injured patients is inhibiting the development of
AIDS drugs. See also Mahoney, The Courts Are Curbing Creativity, N.Y. Times, Dec.
II, 1988, at F3, col. 1, col. 4 ("Additionally, good-faith compliance with up-to-
date Government regulations like those of the F.D.A. should preclude the impo-
sition of punitive damages.").
77. See, e.g., supra notes 44-55 and accompanying text.
78. See Annas, supra note 36.
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political agenda at work in the AIDS context is not patient-
centered.
Perhaps the fact that we do not make heroin available to ter-
minally ill intravenous drug users is a way we have of punishing
them for their illegal behavior. It is equally plausible that we care
so little for the victims of AIDS that we do not care if they get hurt
by quack remedies imported from abroad. It has also been sug-
gested that although we do not accept active euthanasia and look
with disapproval on even terminally ill patients who want physi-
cians to end their lives, we nonetheless believe that it is perfectly
acceptable for individuals to volunteer for medical experiments
that could hasten their deaths:
Our quest for a formula that will banish death seems
to make it acceptable to try questionable regimens on
the aged and terminally ill . . . . Those who insist on
using the dying as experimental subjects ... see death as
abnormal and dying patients as subhuman. We cast the
terminally ill in modern rites of sacrifice, putting patients
of experiments like the Jarvik heart through what one




By making experimental drugs available to AIDS patients
outside of organized clinical trials we are doing little, if anything,
for AIDS patients. We are merely comforting ourselves with the
illusion that something is being done to combat death-an illu-
sion that is all the more satisfying because it does not call for any
additional government funding. But we will pay a high price for
this comfortable illusion if it is used as an excuse to abandon the
distinction between experimentation and therapy and to trans-
form the FDA from a consumer protection agency into a drug
promotion agency.
The FDA has been the focus of much criticism for not pro-
ducing a cure for AIDS. But this is not the FDA's responsibility.
The FDA does not research, manufacture or test new drugs; it
79. Brauer, The Promise that Failed, N.Y. Times, Aug. 28, 1988, § 6 (Maga-
zine), at 34, 76. It has also been persuasively suggested that as the costs of
caring for AIDS patients increase, society will encourage them to opt for no care
or a quick death "by seeming to leave individuals with no alternative to the in-
dignities of their final days but to end them quickly." Schulman, AIDS Discrimi-
nation: Its ature, Weaning and Function, 12 NOVA L. REv. 1113, 1140 (1988).
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approves drugs as "safe and effective" that are made and tested
by others who seek to market them in the United States. Its role
is not to further the interests of drug companies, but to protect
the public. It does this by insisting on strict standards in drug
testing. Shortcuts that undermine these standards risk the health
of all who later use a drug that has been too hastily approved.80
The excuse that patients are dying without treatment and have
"nothing to lose" will not do. Terminally ill patients can be
harmed, misused and exploited. Realistic discussion of death and
accurate education about the status of unproven AIDS drugs and
the reason randomized clinical trials are needed is in order. It is
not compassionate to make quack remedies easily available to
those who can pay for them. True compassion demands that we
allocate the money and staff necessary to do meaningful scientific
research, and that when valid clinical trials demonstrate that a
therapy is "safe and effective," we make it available to all who
need it regardless of their ability to pay, not that we help supply
dying patients with false promises and useless drugs.
80. The requirement of scientifically sound protocols and carefully con-
trolled clinical trials applies to vaccines as well as drugs. See Mariner, Why
Clinical Trials of AIDS Vaccines Are Premature, 79 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 86, 86 (1989).
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